Council meetings in the new year — January 2022

When the Unemployment Insurance Advisory Council last met on 21 October 2021, not much was decided or even reckoned with.

Other than the trust fund balance being $963 million and approval of a draft UI bill, LRB 4438 (unchanged from what was introduced in the September 2021 meeting), nothing much was discussed or decided. Council members even decided to cancel their remaining meetings for November and December.

The big news was that Mark Reihl, UI division head from before the pandemic started, announced his retirement, as of early November 2021.

The pattern continues into 2022, when the council met on January 20th.

Job centers need to be open to the public

A letter from a resident of the southern Lake Winnebago area about job centers being closed to the public and how public libraries are inadequate was met with a reference to how Wisconsin libraries received a grant to do advertising and additional support for job support services at Wisconsin libraries. Ignored in this response is the actual complaint in the letter about how job search support at libraries is inadequate and not meeting the Department’s statutory responsibility to provide support at its own job centers. Furthermore, the confusion and inadequacies of the on-line claim-filing system makes turning to librarians extremely difficult — both for claimants and librarians — when unintentional claim-filing mistakes lead to concealment charges from the Department.

Covid-19 is perhaps worse now than when the pandemic started. But, if job search requirements and claim-filing are to continue pretending that the pandemic does not really exist anymore, then the least the Department can do is open its job centers so that claimants can get the help they actually need. I know that people are leaving jobs because some (maybe more than some) employers are ignoring safety standards and pretending the pandemic no longer exists. The Department is making things worse for claimants struggling in this atmosphere by pushing claimants to on-line only claim-filing, and ill-equipped librarians who do not understand all the complexities and confusions of the on-line claim-filing process is simply asking too much of people who are not directly involved.

For instance, the Department’s job search requirements are quite specific, and many actions people think as qualifying as a job search do not actually qualify. Unless the Department is going to demonstrate how it is training librarians about how to assist confused claimants with understanding the Department’s very specific job search requirements (let alone all of the other “issues” that can catch claimants into making mistakes), then saying talk to a librarian is little more than Calvinball.

Financial report

The unemployment trust fund is back over a billion (indeed, $1.1 billion). Left unremarked on was that in 2021 payment of regular unemployment benefits plummeted to nearly one-third of what was seen in 2020: $583.1 million versus $1,464.7 million. Given that the pandemic still exists and that employees — even in Wisconsin — are leaving jobs at record numbers in 2021, this startlingly drop in payment of regular unemployment benefits indicates that many of the old practices at the Department are re-asserting themselves.

Job searches, as noted above, are extremely difficult to complete to the Department’s satisfaction. Furthermore, all claimants will have their job searches eventually audited (claimants must keep their job searches for one year, and Department staffers tell me that they are under pressure to make sure every claimant gets some of his or her job searches audited within that one-year time frame).

New faces

Jim Chiolino, a mainstay in all kinds of Department operations for the last several decades, is now head of the UI division. Tom McHugh, treasurer of the unemployment trust fund, retired as of January 10th. He will be missed.

Also, Kathy Thornton-Bias joined the council as a management representative for non-profits, replacing Theresa Hillis from the Eau Claire YMCA.

New rules

EmR2125 for waiving benefit charges related to pandemic job losses and for compensating reimbursable employers for their pandemic-related job losses (reimbursable employers like non-profits and government entities pay dollar-for-dollar for unemployment benefits paid to their former employees) continues to be in effect until March 2nd/April 24th of this year.

The Department presented Council members with a highly technical rule change for switching Wisconsin’s regulations from the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) industry classification codes to North American Industry Classifications System (NAICS) industry classification codes — the stuff that labor economists dream about — as well as several other technical changes and corrections.

After caucusing, Council members approved of this new rule.

The Labor and Industry Review Commission also presented to Council members the Commission’s proposed new rules. These proposed rules mostly update Commission procedure in light of all the procedural changes to unemployment law the past few years as well as some less extensive changes to workers’ compensation law during these past years. The only change of note in the unemployment context is that answers to petitions for review in unemployment cases now need to be filed in 14 days rather than 21 days. As answers are rarely filed and usually unnecessary, this change does not raise major concerns (unless increasing delays in mail service make the 14 day window unworkable).

New laws

There was a short presentation on AB691, a bill that would declare that the required use of any safety equipment could not serve as evidence that an operator of a motor vehicle (yes — any motor vehicle, not just truck drivers) could be classified as an employee for purposes of workers’ compensation law, unemployment law, minimum wage law, and wage law. Yikes.

Finally, after caucusing, Council members provided their stamp of approval on two other LRB drafts of the agreed upon bill, LRB-5584 and LRB-5585.For what these bills do, see Advisory Council meeting in August 2021. After caucusing, Council members approved of these draft bills.

Able and available during the pandemic

It has taken almost a year, but there is now a decision from the Labor and Industry Review Commission about being able and available during the pandemic.

This case involves a part-time tour guide for the Capitol. When the pandemic struck, the Capitol building was closed to the public, those tours stopped, and she was laid off.

She applied for unemployment and, when contacted by the Department, explained that, as a 75-year-old woman with underlying health conditions she was concerned about working in a safe environment in the midst of the pandemic.

The Department subsequently denied her claim, asserting that her desire for a safe workplace was an unreasonable decision to restrict her availability.

At her hearing, she explained that she did not know how to respond to a hypothetical job offer for which the relative safety of that hypothetical job was unknown. She did explain that had the Capitol tours continued, she would have continued to work there, as she knew that this work would have been safe. But, she declined to volunteer as an election worker during the April 7th primary, as she did not think that work environment was sufficiently safe for her.

In his decision, an an administrative law judge affirmed her disqualification for NOT being available for work during the pandemic.

The administrative law judge first reviewed Emergency Rule 2006 (expired as of 2 February 2021), which created specific regulations for those with Covid-19 symptoms NOT reporting to work.

DWD 128.01 (7) Covid-19.
(a) Notwithstanding any other subsection in this section, the department shall consider a claimant to be available for suitable work if the claimant is perceived by an employer as exhibiting COVID-19 symptoms preventing a return to work, or the claimant is quarantined by a medical professional due to COVID-19 symptoms, or the claimant is instructed to stay home under local, state or federal government direction or guidance due to COVID-19, and one of the following applies:

1. The employer has instructed the claimant to return to work after the employee no longer exhibits symptoms, after a set amount of time to see if the disease is present, or after the quarantine is over.

2. The employer has not provided clear instruction for the claimant to return to work.

3. The claimant would be available for other work with another employer but for the perceived COVID-19 symptoms preventing a return to work or but for the quarantine.

(b) This subsection shall be good cause for not reporting for an eligibility review under s. DWD 128.03.

As obvious from this text, this exception is limited to what an employer does, a quarantine ordered by a medical provider, or a government public health order that mandates someone not report to work. So, this rule does not apply to this claimant.

The administrative law judge then explained:

In this case, the employee has not regularly worked 32 hours per week for several years. Her avoidance of working the polls on the April election day does not make her unavailable for work. However, she was not working full-time before her layoff and she is not applying for new jobs. As she would not work at a new job unless she determined the job to be safe, the full picture presented is that she is withdrawn from the full-time labor market and is not available for work.

The claimant appealed to the Labor and Industry Review Commission. In an exceptional brief by the clinic’s student coordinator, Emma Wood, she explained that everything about the claimant’s concern for a safe workplace as a 75-year-old woman was reasonable in light of the risks she faced from Covid-19 and that work searches were waived for the pandemic. The law student wrote:

To determine that [the claimant] is unavailable for suitable work because she desired safe work is to say that she is required to accept dangerous work. This is in direct contradiction of the federal and state imposition of the duty of employers to provide a place of employment free from known hazards. 29 USC § 654(a)(1), Wis. Stat. § 101.11(1). A preference for safe work should be considered at least as “understandable” as a salary preference. See, Willert, UI Hearing No. 88-401443MN (LIRC February 23, 1989).

In a decision dated 29 Jan. 2021, the Commission reversed the disqualification. The Commission wrote (footnotes replaced with citations):

As a general rule, to be eligible for unemployment insurance benefits as to any given week, a claimant must he able to work, available for work, and actively seeking work during the week. [Wis. Stat. § 108.04(2)(a)] “Able to work” means that the claimant maintains an attachment to the labor market and has the physical and psychological ability to engage in some substantial gainful employment in suitable work. [Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 128.01(3)(a)] “Available for work” means that the claimant maintains an attachment to the labor market and is ready to perform full-time suitable work in the labor market. “Full-time work” means work performed for 32 hours or more per week. [Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15s)] However, an individual with a physical or psychological restriction will not be considered unavailable for work solely because of his or her inability to work full-time, provided the individual is available for suitable work for the number of hours the individual is able to work. [Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 128.01(3)(b) cited, but should be Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 128.01(4)] A claimant is not available for suitable work if he or she has withdrawn from the labor market due to restrictions on his or her availability for work. [Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 128.01(4)(a)]

Under Wis. Admin. Code § 128.01(2), an employee claiming unemployment benefits is presumed able to work and available for work, unless evidence is obtained that the claiming employee was not able to work or available for work. In her brief, the employee argues she is available for full-time work and correctly notes that her work searches were waived under the emergency administrative rule, ER2006, approved by the rule-making committee of the legislature. The commission conferred with the ALJ who conducted the hearing as to his credibility and demeanor impressions. The ALJ noted the employee was very credible and direct in her testimony and did not try to avoid any questions the ALJ asked of her. Without any contrary evidence to rebut the employee’s testimony, the employee is presumed able to and available for suitable work in her labor market. The commission’s reversal of the ALJ’s decision is based on the unrebutted presumption that the employee was able to and available for work within the meaning of Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 128.01(2) and not any differing credibility assessment.

This Commission decision does NOT accept what the claimant contended — that she had a reasonable belief in wanting a safe workplace. Rather, the Commission holds that the presumption of being able and available was not overcome in this case in light of the pandemic and Emergency Rule 2006, which waived job search requirements.

Still, this decision is important, because it shows that the Department’s efforts to disqualify a part-time worker in light of their history of part-time work is not sufficient to disqualify someone.

Non-acquiescence: Employer aiding and abetting

Besides the personal liability non-acquiescence tax cases discussed in a previous post, the Department also declared on 21 December 2017 that it was “non-acquiescing” to a Labor and Industry Review Commission decision holding that an employer did not aid and abet claimant concealment: In the Matter of National Security and Investigations LLC, UI Hearing No. S1500384AP (6 Dec. 2017) (non-acquiescence 21 Dec. 2017).

NOTE: During the last few years, the Department has been eager to find an aiding and abetting case against an employer. See “Concealment problems for employers too” (15 April 2015) (no aiding and abetting found, in part, because employer unaware of unemployment claims at issue) and Gussert v. Springhetti Landscaping and DWD, UI Hearing Nos. 16400598AP-16400609AP (27 January 2017) (no claimant concealment found in case where Department was alleging aiding and abetting by employer). This case represents the third unsuccessful attempt by the Department at such a case.

In this case, the small employer could not pay the employee anymore because of a shortage of revenue and a lack of timely payment of bills from clients. Given the slow business, the employer told the employee to file a claim for unemployment benefits, and the employee did so.

In those claims, the employee did not report any work for the employer since he was not getting paid for his work. During these weeks, the employer provided alternative compensation to the employee: a canoe, a car for a spouse, cash, use of a debit card, and use of a company vehicle.

The employee eventually quit because of a lack of work. He then filed a wage complaint for unpaid wages against the employer, and a settlement was eventually worked out. After the settlement and resolution of the wage case, the employer informed the Department of unreported wages during the weeks the employee had filed claims for unemployment benefits.

The Department charged the employee with concealment, and no appeal of that charge was filed. The Department also charged the employer with aiding and abetting claimant concealment because the employer told the employee to file a claim for unemployment benefits as work was slow and revenue was behind.

NOTE: That aiding and abetting charge was for $9320 (for what appears to be 25 weeks of benefits at $373 per week) plus another $12500 in additional penalties ($500 for each week of the alleged 25 weeks of concealment) for a total liability to the employer of $21,820.

This accusation was not enough to demonstrate aiding and abetting for the Commission, however. The Commission explained (footnote omitted):

The record shows that the department’s initial finding of aiding and abetting was based on the adjudicator’s impression that the employer instructed [the claimant] not to report hours and wages to the department when filing for unemployment benefits. The employer clearly told [the claimant] to file for benefits while work was slow, but there is no objective evidence in the record that an agreement existed between the employer and [the claimant] to conceal work and wages from the department.

The distinction noted by the Commission here is vitally important. Claimants are entitled to benefits when available work has declined, and so there is nothing wrong with a claimant filing for partial unemployment benefits because of a decline in available work. Indeed, the formula for partial unemployment benefits encourages claims for unemployment benefits by making employees eligible for those benefits even when working numerous hours and receiving substantial pay in a given week.

This basic eligibility criteria certainly casts some shade on what the Department is alleging in this case. Because the Department in this case is essentially claiming that an employer encouraging an employee to file for unemployment benefits because of a lack of available work constitutes aiding and abetting, the Department is turning a basic eligibility issue into a point of liability for both employer and employee whenever there is cooperation between the two.

There is an additional problem with this case for employers: the employer, angry at having to settle a wage case, tried to turn the tables on its former employee by informing the Department about the former employee’s prior unemployment claims. Because the employer and employee were at one time friendly with each other, however, the Department turned their initial lack of hostility into a kind of conspiracy charge about unemployment benefits being paid in lieu of regular wages.

Luckily for the employer, the Commission saw through the dubious nature of this claim (footnote omitted):

Under the facts in this case, the commission finds that the most reasonable inference to draw is that [the claimant] intentionally withheld his time sheets in January, February, March, and April 2014 because it was to his advantage to do so. It was [the claimant’s] understanding, or justification, that he could claim unemployment benefits because he was not getting a paycheck. The unemployment benefits [the claimant] received provided him with money “to live on” and satisfied, at least in part, his child support obligation. Later, after he quit his employment with the employer, [the claimant] attempted to get paid for the hours listed on his time sheets, which had not been previously submitted, by filing a complaint with the state.

The employer unquestionably could have been more diligent in analyzing its unemployment insurance reserve fund balance statements, but the fact that the employer failed to do so does not prove that the employer willingly assisted [the claimant in concealing work and wage information from the department. The employer did not know how partial benefits are calculated and believed that any weekly amount less than $360 was a partial benefit. [The claimant’s] co-worker claimed unemployment benefits during the first four months of 2014, and he reported working for and earning wages from the employer. There is no sound reason why the employer would aid and abet [the claimant] in concealing work and wages from the department while, at the same time, allowing [the claimant’s] co-worker to report work and wage information to the department.

But, any employer should take away from this case the fact that the Department is refusing to accept it as precedent. The Department believes that cooperation between employer and employee about eligibility for unemployment benefits could easily be the basis for an aiding and abetting charge against the employer. As the employer was originally charged with over $21,000 in liability for that alleged aiding and abetting, the danger being created by the Department here is much more than a speculative problem for small employers.

The Department essentially wants to punish employers who think their employees should be eligible for unemployment benefits. Should employers change their mind about that “cooperation,” they face a very real risk of being targeted by the Department.

Non-acquiescence: Employer tax cases

First, some apologies for the title to this post. Non-acquiescence is a ten-dollar word for disagree. Essentially, the Department has the ability per Wis. Stat. § 108.10(7)(b) to declare publicly that it disagrees with a decision of the Labor and Industry Review Commission but will not appeal that decision into the courts. The Department has this option because an appeal of a decision into the courts faces the risk of the Commission’s decision being affirmed. That affirmation would then turn that case into a precedent the Department would be required to follow.

NOTE: The Department is supposed to follow Commission decisions as precedent. This non-acquiescence process provides a mechanism for the Department to declare officially that it will NOT follow a Commission decision as precedent.

Second, from May 2018 to January 2019, the Department began regularly issuing notices of non-acquiescence in employer tax cases where personal liability for those taxes were at issue. In all of these cases, the Commission found that personal liability was NOT justified largely because the individuals being pursued were not actually the owner/controlling person of the employing entity. These fact specific inquiries, however, somehow led the Department to believe that the Commission was not applying unemployment law in the way the Department wanted these cases decided. Here are the cases:

• In the Matter of Butcher, UI Hearing No. S1600067EC (2 May 2018) (Non-acquiescence 16 May 2018)
• In the Matter of Froode, UI Hearing No. S1500379MW (18 April 2018) (Non-acquiescence 16 May 2018)
• In the Matter of Corley, UI Hearing No. S1600241MD (31 May 2018) (Non-acquiescence 28 June 2018)
• In the Matter of Perez, UI Hearing No. S1600149MW (30 Aug. 2018) (Non-acquiescence 1 Oct. 2018)
• In the Matter of Miranda, UI Hearing No. S1500142MW (30 Aug. 2018) (Non-acquiescence 1 Oct. 2018)
• In the Matter of Proven Dental, UI Hearing No. S1700099MW (29 Nov. 2018) (Non-acquiescence 20 Dec. 2018)
• In the Matter of Drake, UI Hearing Nos. S1500396EC and S1500400EC (21 Dec. 2018) (Non-acquiescence 18 Jan. 2019)

In almost all of these decisions, the Commission found that there was NO personal liability for unpaid employer unemployment taxes because the person targeted in these cases essentially did not qualify as the owner or manager responsible for those unemployment taxes.

NOTE: Keep in mind that corporate protection and limited liability does NOT apply to unpaid unemployment taxes. See, e.g., EOG Environmental Inc., UI Hearing No. S1100346MW (27 Aug. 2013) (the Department filed a notice of non-acquiescence in this case as well) and Henry Warner, UI Hearing No. S9100679MW (16 July 1993) for excellent descriptions of the personal liability issues that attach to individuals regardless of incorporation when unemployment taxes go unpaid.

In other words, the Department is pursuing in these cases additional liability for unpaid unemployment taxes. The Department is arguing that the named person is the manager or owner responsible for paying unemployment taxes and that he or she failed to meet that responsibility. The Corley case provides an excellent example of what is going on with these cases (I spoke with the attorney who represented the defendant individual in that case).

In Corley, a father had sold his trucking business decades before to his son who took over day-to-day management of the operation, The father remained a figurehead director of the company, however, for the sake of assuring customers and others that the father’s experience and judgment were available to the son. The father had little to any active involvement with management by 2008 or so but continued to staff office and personnel matters as a favor to his son.

With the great recession, the company came on hard times and went under by 2011 or 2012. During the course of going under, unemployment taxes went unpaid. Collection efforts by the Department ensued against the son (not mentioned in the Commission’s decision, as the collection efforts at issue here were against the father).

Apparently, those collection efforts were not going as well as the Department wanted, so it targeted the father, who at the time was working as a trucker again and living out of his tractor-trailer cab because of the economic losses and debts he had incurred from the recession. This targeting of the father for additional revenue/collection explains why the record is so spotty about the father’s actual role and involvement in the company’s unpaid unemployment taxes and what was allegedly owed by the father.

The Commission in its decision essentially finds that there is no proof of any unpaid debts for which the father was responsible. This lack of factual evidence in the record about the father’s personal liability, however, is a principle the Department does not want to accept as a limit on personal liability. So, the Department filed its notice of non-acquiescence in this matter. The Department does not want “actual evidence” to serve as a limit on its claims of personal liability. On that basis, this declaration by the Department is shocking.

So, in this light this flurry of non-acquiescence declarations by the Department signals a state agency targeting small employers and the individuals connected to them in any way possible as sources for continued and never-ending debt collection. Claimants in concealment cases are not the only folks who have experienced the unforgiving and relentless push by the Department to collect no matter what and to collect even and ever again simply because the Department asserts that monies are owed. Should another recession occur, there are many, many employers who will feel this bite from the Department and face the unending and pervasive debt collection the Department wants.

DWD and LIRC continue to ignore court precedent on substantial fault

After the Supreme Court decision in Operton v. LIRC, 2017 WI 46, and an appeals court decision in Easterling v. LIRC, 2017 WI App 18, the Department of Workforce Development took no action to change its practices and follow these binding court decisions. Accordingly, parties needed to appeal their initial determinations in order to get unemployment law to be followed.

It is becoming apparent, however, that numerous appeals are now needed to get unemployment law to be followed whenever claimants are involved. Marilyn Townsend, Operton’s legal representative, just won an unemployment case in circuit court where DWD and the appeal tribunal not only continued to ignore Operton in an almost identical situation — namely a charge of several inadvertent errors by the employee — but the Labor and Industry Review Commission affirmed a finding of substantial fault by adding alleged warnings for which there was NO evidence in the record. As the circuit court judge explained (emphasis supplied):

The stated reasons for discharge were allegations that there were receiving issues on three separate dates in January of 2018. The store’s witness said he was only familiar with the incident that occurred on January 13th. The employer must prove the allegations upon which the discharge was based. Standing alone, this court does not believe that the January 13th incident [concerning a document mis-match between inventory and an invoice] is substantial evidence of substantial fault.

The plaintiff stated that she believed two pieces of paper merely stuck together and that is the reason the invoice was not scanned properly. She realized on the same day that an invoice could not be matched to the inventory and the [employer] witness (Ovsak) said she came to him and explained the problem. Apparently the problem was resolved when they received another invoice from the supplier on the following Monday.

There is no argument or claim that the plaintiff did anything intentionally wrong. In fact, she discovered her error and reported it to her supervisor. It appears that the incident was an inconvenience for the employer, but nothing more. The Commission agreed with the ALJ that the employee’s conduct did not rise to the level of an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer’s interest. There is no evidence that this single act was anything but an inadvertent error.

* * *

The Commission modified the decision to of the ALJ to fit the conclusion the ALJ wanted to reach. It decided that the January 13th incident, along with three prior coaching incidents during the second half of the fall of 2017, served as the reasons for discharge. Specifically, leaving a receiving door unlocked in August of 2017, an alleged incident of being belligerent and speaking with a raised voice on November 9th, and failing to accurately count some DVD’s on November 22th. The plaintiff says those earlier coachings are not relevant in determining whether the discharge after those coachings was for substantial fault where the employer has failed to prove the subsequent allegations that actually prompted the discharge.

The employer offered no proof at all of two of the three grounds alleged in the discharge document. While it offered proof that the January 13th, 2018 incident occurred, that act in the opinion of this court was not evidence of substantial fault. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has ruled that careless conduct does not equal substantial fault. Operton v. LIRC, 2017 WI 46, 375 Wis.2d 1.

The Commission relied on the prior coachings in 2017 as well as the January 13th incident to justify the finding of substantial fault. . . . the mere fact that [the Commission] did indicates that the Commission felt it necessary to essentially correct and bolster the findings of the ALJ in order to try and justify denying the plaintiff benefits.

Those prior coachings appear to be unrelated to the action on January 13th. They appear to be minor infractions and they did not lead to a dismissal standing on their own. The Commission cannot create evidence of substantial fault by adding the prior unrelated coachings to the January 13th incident.

So, now not only is DWD ignoring Operton, but administrative law judges at the Department’s hearing offices are also ignoring Operton. And, the Commission is also now ignoring Operton and seeking to get around Operton by adding arguments and connecting evidence in ways that the record obviously does not support.

The Department and the Commission are supposed to be NEUTRAL entities that are supposed to assess the evidence presented by employers to meet their heavy burden of persuasion in order to disqualify a claimant from receiving unemployment benefits when misconduct or substantial fault have occurred.

What this case illustrates is that the Department, the hearing offices, and the Commission are ignoring these obligations and instead looking to disqualify claimants on nothing more than whim and pretense, even when courts have directly told them otherwise.

Given the hundreds to thousands of people who apply for unemployment benefits every week in Wisconsin, it should in NO way require an attorney well-versed in the intricacies of unemployment law take an appeal into court simply so that unemployment law might be followed. An initial determination, a hearing before an administrative law judge, and an appeal to the Commission all failed in this case to follow clear and unmistakable black letter unemployment law.

An employee having to take up an appeal to circuit court and find an attorney for that appeal for the sake of simple justice in an unemployment case is in practical terms not possible for the hundreds and thousands seeking unemployment benefits every week of the year in Wisconsin. Something is fundamentally wrong when claimants have to go to such lengths simply to get the unemployment benefits due them if the law had been followed in the first place.

Note: Links to the appeal tribunal and LIRC decisions will be added.

Despite Operton and Easterling, no change with substantial fault at DWD

The Easterling and especially Operton decisions should indicate that inadvertent — i.e., careless or unintentional mistakes — on the job should not disqualify someone from unemployment benefits.

The Department, however, is not happy with these outcomes. At the Advisory Council’s 16 March 2017 meeting, the following public comments were made about Easterling:

Ms. Knutson stated the decision in this case will provide general guidance to adjudicators and ALJs; however, cases are very fact-intensive to determine if it is truly an inadvertent error or substantial fault. Mr. Manley stated there should be a way to sharpen the definition of substantial fault to leave less gray area for interpretation and would not allow exceptions that disregard the entire rule. An employee that signed an employer policy of expectations that were not followed should not be able to claim that those policies were not followed because of a mistake to claim benefits. Mr. Manley expressed concern that the decision by the Court of Appeals is not within the spirit of what the Legislature intended to be as the definition of substantial fault. If decisions are based on this conclusion because the statute is not worded as clearly as it should be, it should be revisited.

Meeting Materials at 12.

NOTE: Both the Department and the Advisory Council have apparently forgotten that the council rejected substantial fault. Mr. Manley’s comments, moreover, ignore the basic requirements in unemployment law that employees NOT be disqualified for their unintentional, performance-related mistakes.

Inside the Department, however, the comments have not been so sanguine. In mid-May after Operton was decided, a Department insider explained to me:

The Operton decision went to the adjudication staff soon after it was issued. At a staff meeting a few days later, a supervisor said that there would be no new training on substantial fault despite the decision.

This lack of re-training in light of Operton is important. After Easterling, Ms. Knutsen simply noted that substantial fault involved a fact-intensive inquiry but provided NO explanation about what the Department would do to implement and follow Easterling. Now, a Department supervisor is indicating that there would be NO new training in how to follow the Wisconsin Supreme Court precedent in Operton. In other words, the Department is continuing to apply its pre-Operton and pre-Easterling standards for substantial fault.

A recent clinic case confirms this observation. In this case, the Department denied unemployment benefits to a teller discharged for cash-handling errors. The initial determination stated:

The employee was discharged because her performance did not meet the employer’s expectations. Her final incident was within her control; her actions do not rise to the level of misconduct. It was within the employee’s control to meet the reasonable requirements; therefore, her discharge is considered to be for substantial fault on the part of the employee.

Here, the Department is still applying its pre-Operton and pre-Easterling analysis of determining whether the employee was in control of the action in question. Under this framework, inadvertent errors only occur when employees lack control over their actions. The unintentional or accidental nature of the errors does not matter at all under this analysis.

NOTE: At the 17 November 2016 Advisory Council meeting, the Department presented a memorandum describing some misconduct and substantial fault decisions. The decisions covered in the substantial fault section of the memorandum describe only a few Commission decisions over whether the employee’s actions were major or minor infractions of company rules or involved absenteeism issues. There is no discussion of what constitutes reasonable employer expectations, what actions are reasonably in an employee’s control, what actions are inadvertent errors, and what actions are the result of an employee’s lack of skill, ability, or equipment.

Marilyn Townsend, Operton’s legal representative, took the teller’s case on and over-turned the initial denial of unemployment benefits at the hearing stage. The decision of the appeal tribunal, however, did not apply Operton despite the obvious similarities. At the hearing, there was no indication whatsoever that the teller’s errors were anything other than unintentional and accidental. Yet, the administrative law judge found that the teller essentially lacked the skills to do the work assigned her after a promotion (another exception to substantial fault) and then committed no errors after being demoted which would justify the discharge.

the record reveals that the employee requested additional training and support for her work performance issues. She did not receive the additional training and support which leads to the conclusion that she lacked the skill and ability to perform the job. The employee also struggled to perform the Phase II role and was demoted back to a Phase I role. While working in a Phase I role, the record demonstrated that the employee didn’t have any work performance matters. If she did have infractions in her Phase I role, those matters were not raised on the record by the employer.

So, there are decisions from the Court of Appeals and the state Supreme Court that explain that, pursuant to the statutory language for substantial fault, accidental or unintentional mistakes on the job are inadvertent errors and do not qualify as substantial fault. As of June 2017, however, the Department is ignoring these court decisions when applying what it believes substantial fault should or should not include.

What should claimants do? Appeal. As the Department and the Department’s administrative law judges are NOT following court precedent, claimants have to appeal initial determinations denying them unemployment benefits to appeal tribunals and then the Commission. The Commission will follow court precedent about inadvertent errors and reverse disqualifications based on accidental and unintentional errors on the job.

Absenteeism decision excludes zero-tolerance policy as misconduct

Today’s appeals court decision in DWD v. LIRC (hereafter referred to as Beres), Appeal No. 2016-AP-1365 (recommended for publication) holds that an employer’s absenteeism policy of one discharge in the first 90 days of a probationary period does NOT qualify as per se misconduct.

In this case, the employee landed a job at a nursing home. Flu-like symptoms, however, led her to miss work, and the employer let her go because she missed a day of work during her 90-day probationary period. When the employee filed a claim for unemployment benefits, the Department found misconduct because she violated the employer’s zero-tolerance absenteeism policy. Per Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5)(e) (emphasis supplied):

Absenteeism by an employee on more than 2 occasions within the 120-day period before the date of the employee’s termination, unless otherwise specified by his or her employer in an employment manual of which the employee has acknowledged receipt with his or her signature . . .

The Department has concluded that this italicized portion of this statute allows employers to decide for themselves how many absences will constitute misconduct for unemployment purposes.

NOTE: This position is a stunning development in contradiction of the rest of unemployment law that presumes employee eligibility for unemployment benefits and establishes the economic importance of unemployment benefits for addressing macro-economic issues in the state’s economy. The Department’s stance means that employers gain the unilateral ability under this provision to determine for themselves when an employee commits misconduct for unemployment purposes.

The Commission reversed, holding that the more than two absences in 120 days provisions without notice sets a floor for a finding of misconduct. The employee was not responsible for her illness, the Commission noted, and so she missed work through no fault of her own — the classic formulation about when employees are eligible for unemployment benefits.

After a circuit court over-turned the Commission’s decision and agreed with the Department, the Commission appealed the case to the appeals court. The appeals court agreed with the Commission that its interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5)(e) was more reasonable than the Department’s. The appeals court in Beres at ¶¶18-20 explained:

The purpose of unemployment insurance benefits is to serve as a bridge for employees from one job to the next or “to cushion the effect of unemployment,” absent “actions or conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer’s interests.” Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5); Boynton Cab, 237 Wis. at 258-59.

An example illustrates the reasonableness of LIRC’s interpretation that Beres’ actions did not rise to the level to deny benefits. Assume Beres was found to be in a tavern during her scheduled shift and, when called, lied about being sick. At the opposite end of the spectrum, assume that Beres was involved in a serious car accident within two hours of the start of her shift due to no fault of her own and required hospitalization. In both of these examples, Beres would be in violation of [the employer’s] attendance policy. LIRC’s interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5) and (5)(e) allows an examination of the employee’s conduct in relation to both the employer’s policy as well as the policy that unemployment benefits should only be denied if the employee engages in actions constituting misconduct or substantial fault. The first example would likely qualify as misconduct under both § 108.04(5) and [the employer’s] written attendance policy, whereas the second example is a technical violation of [the employer’s] attendance policy, but is not an act of misconduct or substantial fault.

Employers are free to adopt a “zero-tolerance” attendance policy and discharge employees for that reason, but not every discharge qualifies as misconduct for unemployment insurance purposes. As our supreme court explained, “The principle that violation of a valid work rule may justify discharge but at the same time may not amount to statutory ‘misconduct’ for unemployment compensation purposes has been repeatedly recognized by this court.” Casey, 71 Wis.2d at 819-20. Similarly, this court found in Operton that employers have “the right to have high expectations of its employees and also [have] the right to discharge an employee for not meeting their expectations,” but we concluded that high expectations were insufficient to deny unemployment benefits. See Operton, 369 Wis.2d 166, ¶31.

A few additional comments about this decision are warranted. First, the appeals court gets the legislative history of this new absenteeism provision wrong. In Beres at ¶2, the appeals court describes the history this way:

Prompted by concerns within the employer community that eligibility for unemployment benefits was too generous, the legislature, in 2013, made wholesale changes to the unemployment benefit law, including modifying the absenteeism ineligibility criteria from “5 or more” absences without notice in a twelve-month period to “more than 2” absences without notice in a 120-day period, “unless otherwise specified by his or her employer in an employment manual.” Compare Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5g)(c) (2011-12), with § 108.04(5)(e) (emphasis added). It is this final clause that is at the heart of the dispute.

In actuality, the concerns prompted by the employer community were only what the Department noted when it — on its own initiative — originated an extensive re-write of unemployment law. See D12-01. The Advisory Council actually rejected these proposed changes and instead put forward the following changes to the then existing absenteeism provisions in Wis. Stat. § 108.05(5g):

“(5g) DISCHARGE FOR FAILURE TO NOTIFY EMPLOYER OF ABSENTEEISM OR TARDINESS.

(a) If an employee is discharged for failing to notify his or her employer of absenteeism or tardiness that becomes excessive, and the employer has complied with the requirements of par. (d) with respect to that employee, the employee is ineligible to receive benefits until 6 weeks have elapsed since the end of the week in which the discharge occurs and the employee earns wages after the week in which the discharge occurs equal to at least 6 times the employee’s weekly benefit rate under s. 108.05 (1) in employment or other work covered by the unemployment insurance law of any state or the federal government. For purposes of requalification, the employee’s weekly benefit rate shall be the rate that would have been paid had the discharge not occurred.

(b) For purposes of this subsection, tardiness becomes excessive if an employee is late for 6 4 or more scheduled workdays in the 12 month 120 day period preceding the date of the discharge without providing adequate notice to his or her employer.

(c) For purposes of this subsection, absenteeism becomes excessive if an employee is absent for 5 2 or more scheduled workdays in the 12-month 120 day period preceding the date of the discharge without providing adequate notice to his or her employer.

(d) 1. The requalifying requirements under par. (a) apply only if the employer has a written policy on notification of tardiness or absences that:

a. Defines what constitutes a single occurrence of tardiness or absenteeism;

b. Describes the process for providing adequate notice of tardiness or absence, and, regarding tardiness, which gives the employee a reasonable time for providing notice and which at least allows the employee the opportunity to provide notice as soon as practically possible; and

c. Notifies the employee that failure to provide adequate notice of an absence or tardiness may lead to discharge.

2. The employer shall provide a copy of the written policy under subd. 1. to each employee and shall have written evidence that the employee received a copy of that policy.

3. The employer must have given the employee at least one warning concerning the employee’s violation of the employer’s written policy under subd. 1. within the 12 month period preceding the date of the discharge.

4. The employer must apply the written policy under subd. 1. uniformly to all employees of the employer.

(e) The department shall charge to the fund’s balancing account the cost of any benefits paid to an employee that are otherwise chargeable to the account of an employer that is subject to the contribution requirements under ss. 108.17 and 108.18 if the employee is discharged by that employer and par. (a) applies.

(em) If an employee is not disqualified under this subsection, the employee may nevertheless be subject to the disqualification under sub. (5). [general misconduct law]

As obvious, this proposal is not what ended up being enacted. See “Advisory Council Meeting — 1 April 2013” (council declined to adopt proposed substantial fault standard but recommended adding various examples of misconduct). The Department, however, never acted on the Advisory Council’s recommendations. Instead, on 29 May 2013 the Joint Finance Committee added the rejected substantial fault and misconduct standards to the budget bill that eventually became 2013 Wis Act 20. See “Advisory Council — 2 May 2013 meeting — and legislative actions today” and “JFC UI amendments” (JFC motion to amend budget bill included various unemployment financing provisions and rejected substantial fault, misconduct, and quit provisions; DWD drafted bills that eventually became 2013 Wis. Act 36 never included the Advisory Council’s agreed-upon misconduct and quit proposals). Accordingly, these changes to unemployment law went against the express recommendations of the Advisory Council.

Second, the appeals court reaches its holding with either a de novo or due weight standard of deference. Beres at n.5. The proposed elimination of LIRC will likely mean that the Department replaces the Commission to whom courts defer on unemployment matters.

Third, a dissent in Beres at ¶¶22-31 essentially accepts the Department’s position that employers get to enact their own misconduct standards per this new absenteeism provision.

Given this dissent and how this argument, if accepted, essentially would undo unemployment eligibility in Wisconsin, a certiorari petition from the Department to the Wisconsin Supreme Court is likely, and I suspect such a petition will be accepted.

LIRC’s elimination

Governor Walker’s proposed FY2018-FY2019 budget includes the startling elimination of the Labor and Industry Review Commission.

Previously in 2015, DWD raided the Commission’s budget and had its general counsel demoted and replaced.

This attack was apparently not enough. All sources available to me indicate that DWD’s unemployment division pushed for the Commission’s elimination, and Governor Walker acceded to DWD’s demands (more on this issue below).

The agency description document reveals basic numbers about this elimination: the Commission is only funded for six months into the next budget year, and so the Commission will cease to exist on midnight, 31 December 2017. More than 26 staffers will be let go, including three Commissioners (only two currently appointed, as Commissioner Jordahl saw the writing on the wall and jumped to the Public Service Commission). As almost all the Commission’s funding is from federal sources or specific fees, only $265,500 in actual state tax revenue is being saved by the Commission’s elimination.

The budget bill, AB64, has the details about what is happening. For unemployment, see pp.663-74 of the bill.

In general, the budget bill makes a division head (who is a political appointee serving at the pleasure of the governor) as the appellate review authority in place of the Commission.

• For workers’ compensation cases, that person is Brian Hayes, head of Division of Hearings and Appeals.
• For discrimination cases, that person is Robert Rodriguez, head of DWD’s Equal Rights division.
• For unemployment, that person is Joseph Handrick, head of DWD’s unemployment division.

In this proposed budget bill, these division heads will take over for the Commission effective on July 1st of this year. In other words, on July 1st or afterwards any appeals filed with the Commission will no longer be valid. As a result, these division heads will need to provide notice about appeal rights to parties in workers’ compensation, equal rights/discrimination, and unemployment cases perhaps as early as June 1st. And, they will need to do so regardless of when the budget bill is actually passed.

Neither the workers’ compensation or equal rights divisions have staff attorneys on hand to handle these appeals. In 2015 (the latest year case load data is available), there were 214 workers’ compensation cases filed with the Commission, 230 decisions issued, and 32 cases appealed to court that the Commission had to defend. As there were 422 workers’ compensation decisions by administrative law judges that year, over 50% of those decisions were appealed to the Commission in 2015.

For equal rights cases that same year, there were 77 appeals filed with the Commission, and it issued 94 decisions, of which 19 were appealed to court and hence defended by the Commission. The 239 decisions by administrative law judges include many kinds of cases for which there is no appeal to the Commission (such as fair employment or medical leave cases), only appeal to circuit court. So, the percentage of discrimination cases appealed to the Commission is probably much higher than the 32% suggested by this raw data and is probably close to 50% of the cases for which appeal rights to the Commission exist.

In 2015, there were 59 appeals of employer tax cases to the Commission. The Commission issued 49 decisions that year, and three of those were appealed into circuit court. Administrative law judges issued 397 employer tax decisions that year.

The unemployment numbers are eye-popping for claimants. Unemployment appeals involving claimants numbered 1,735 in 2015 (~144 a month), and the Commission issued 1,773 decisions (~147 a month). Forty-eight of these cases were appealed to circuit court. Administrative law judges issued 18,172 claimant benefit decisions that year.

None of these division heads is loosing any of their current job duties, and there appears to be no provisions for hiring additional staff to handle their new appellate review duties. So, appellate review by division heads will have to occur when they find the time. As obvious from these numbers, that review will be perfunctory at best. For workers’ compensation and discrimination cases, the budget bill is simply shifting the responsibility for review into circuit and appellate courts. These division administrators are likely to rubber stamp all appeals that arrive on their desks (at least initially). Of course, costs to employers and employees associated with this move to court review will be increased, because they will need to pay for attorneys and filing fees after going through the motions for the perfunctory division review. As a result, the number of cases being appealed will likely decline because employers and employees simply cannot afford the additional costs that court review entails. In other words, injustices and basic mistakes at the hearing stage will likely go uncorrected and lawyers will have fewer paying clients.

The unemployment review process represents a slightly different picture from the other agencies. DWD’s unemployment division already has six to eight staff attorneys available to it. Indeed, it is these attorneys who prosecute employer tax cases, who conduct training of administrative law judges, and who occasionally prosecute claimants in unemployment concealment cases. These staff attorneys will most likely take on the task of reviewing the 1,700+ division appeals that land on Joe Handrick’s desk. So, employers will face an attorney prosecuting the tax cases against them and then having that same attorney or a co-worker of that attorney reviewing the merits of any appeal. Indeed, the same DWD attorney who lost a decision before an administrative law judge could appeal that lost decision and then conduct or advise on the division review.

NOTE: under this budget bill, DWD also retains the ability to appeal any decision of the division administrator to circuit court. DWD, in essence, can appeal itself. Huh?

Recall that the Commission was created as an independent agency in the late 1970s. Previously, the Commission managed the entire Department of Industry, Labor, and Human Services (DWD’s previous incarnation) and also handled appellate review of discrimination, workers’ compensation, and unemployment cases. At the time, there were concerns raised about staff attorneys and administrative law judges who were involved in cases having a hand in the appellate review of those cases by the Commission, even though at that time there was a separate division dedicated to appellate review. To address those concerns, in part, the Commission and the staff section dedicated to appellate review were separated and made into a distinct agency. In this way, the Commission would be insulated from political concerns and improper communications among attorneys who were connected to the parties in a case.

As obvious, the proposed budget bill reverses this change and does so without any of the protections needed for keeping Department attorneys who handle a case before an administrative law judge or who advise that judge about how to handle cases on a certain topic from also having a voice in the appellate review of that case. Furthermore, without additional staff, this proposal essentially makes the Department’s concerns about how a case should be resolved of primary importance. After all, cases have to be decided in a timely manner, and the increased case loads from this change will focus attorney’s attention pretty much on the Department’s own substantive goals rather than on the concerns of the parties for a fair and impartial hearing free of any thumbs on the scales.

And, this thumb on the scales leads to why the Commission is being eliminated in the first place. My sources indicate that the unemployment division of DWD is furious with the Commission because it has not accepted the Department’s push to charge claimants’ simple mistakes with concealment. The Commission continues to follow the statutory requirements that for the Department to demonstrate claimant concealment the Department must present evidence that the claimant made a mistake on his or her weekly claim certification and that the claimant understood or knew by making that mistake she or he would get extra unemployment benefits beyond what he or she should have received.

NOTE: the purported rationale for the Commission’s elimination is to get the average age of the Commission’s pending unemployment decisions at or below 40 days. That is, the Commission on average should issue an unemployment decision within 40 days of the appeal. Through September of 2016, the average age of the Commission’s unemployment cases was 37 days. So, the Commission is ALREADY meeting this requirement. See p.2 of the agency description document.

Here is a run-down of some of the concealment issues the Department wants over-turned:

• The Commission refuses to accept financial need as a reason for finding a claimant intended to steal unemployment benefits (unemployment benefits are by their very nature intended to address a financial need). Wallenkamp v. Arby’s Restaurants, UI Hearing No. 13607281MW and 13607282MW (15 May 2014), aff’d DWD v. LIRC, 367 Wis.2d 749, 877 N.W.2d 650 (2 February 2016); Gussert v. Springhetti Landscaping and DWD, UI Hearing Nos. 16400598AP-16400609AP (27 January 2017).
• The Commission refuses to find concealment for non-reported wages when claimants subsequently report those wages a few weeks later. Bilton v. H & R Block Eastern Enterprises, Inc., UI Hearing Nos. 13605766MW and 13605682MW (9 Jan. 2014); Perlongo v. Joey’s Seafood & Grill, UI Hearing Nos. 13610060MW & 13610061MW (22 July 2014).
• The Commission continues to find that an October 2012 transformation of a weekly claim certification question into a compound question was confusing and did not warrant a finding of concealment for mistaken claims based on that confusion (beginning in week 43 of 2012, the week ending 27 October 2012, Question No. 4 was modified from “Did you work?” to “During the week, did you work or did you receive or will you receive sick pay, bonus pay or commission?”). Harris v. Arandell Corp., UI Hearing Nos. 13606535MW and 13606536MW (9 Jan. 2014); Henning v. Visiting Angels, UI Hearing Nos. 13606277MW and 13606278MW (9 Jan. 2014); Chao v. Eagle Movers Inc., UI Hearing No. 13607069M and 13607071MW (17 Jan. 2014); Maurer v. Manpower US Inc., UI Hearing No. 13607416MW and 13607417MW (28 Jan. 2014); Wallenkamp v. Arby’s Restaurants, UI Hearing No. 13607281MW and 13607282MW (15 May 2014), aff’d DWD v. LIRC, 367 Wis.2d 749, 877 N.W.2d 650 (2 February 2016); Audwin Short, UI Hearing No. 14600693MW (10 July 2014); Smith v. Journal Sentinel, Inc., UI Hearing Nos. 13610174MW (31 July 2014); Jackson v. Securitas Security Services, Inc., UI Hearing Nos. 14606875MW and 14606876MW (9 June 2015).
• The Commission continues to raise questions about the conduct of administrative law judges who take it upon themselves to chastise claimants for their presumed concealment rather than hearing the evidence as presented and presuming claimant eligibility as the law requires. Henning v. Visiting Angels, UI Hearing Nos. 13606277MW and 13606278MW (9 Jan. 2014); Fera v. South East Cable LLC, UI Hearing Nos. 13607375MW (31 July 2014); Vasquez v. Fedex Smartpost Inc., UI Hearing Nos. 14602073MW and 14602074MW (24 September 2014).
• The Commission continues to find that claimants who are confused about what needs to be reported are just making mistakes and not committing concealment. Hollett v. Douglas Shafler, UI Hearing Nos. 13003690MW and 130003691MW (8 May 2014); Dabo v. Personalized Plus Home Health, UI Hearing No. 14609522MW and 14609523MW (16 April 2015); O’Neill v. Riteway Bus Service Inc., UI Hearing No. 15600518MW and 15600519MW (28 May 2015); Gussert v. Springhetti Landscaping and DWD, UI Hearing Nos. 16400598AP-16400609AP (27 January 2017).
• The Commission continues to find that claimants who are confused about their status as employees or independent contractors are not committing concealment. Haebig v. News Publishing Co. Inc. of Mt. Horeb, UI Hearing Nos. 13000910MD, 13000911MD, and 13000912MD (31 January 2014); David Mumm, UI Hearing No. 13003988MD (28 Feb. 2014); Martin R. Lash, UI Hearing No. 13403269AP (30 May 2014).
• The Commission refuses to give the Department three chances to prove concealment against claimants. Terry v. Jane Schapiro, UI Hearing Nos. 14601971MW and 14601972MW (12 Sept. 2014).
• The Commission refuses to find concealment for claimants who fail to report wages they do not know about when they file the weekly certifications. Bilton v. H&R Block Eastern Enterprises Inc., UI Hearing Nos. 13605766MW and 13605682MW (9 January 2014).
• The Commission refuses to find concealment for claimants who mistakenly report their earnings when received rather than when earned. Waoh-Tobin v. Banana Republic, UI Hearing No. 16602900MW (18 October 2016).
• The Commission even refuses to allow a finding of concealment when there is no information in the record about whether the employee worked any specific weeks, received any wages in those weeks, filed possible claims for those weeks, and then possibly provided information on those non-existent claims that were somehow mistaken from the unknown work and wages allegedly done. Fera v. South East Cable LLC, UI Hearing Nos. 13607375MW (31 July 2014).

The Department disagrees with the Commission on all of these concealment issues. So, the Department has decided to have the Commission eliminated and anoint itself as the Commission’s replacement. Anyone interested in the impartial rule of law should be aghast at this development. Review will by design be done by political appointees whose job is to accomplish the political objectives of the governor who appointed them.

If this change goes forward, no one — not employer nor employee — should expect a fair hearing in any DWD case.

The problems in unemployment matters will appear almost immediately. First and foremost, the Commission is being eliminated because it disagrees with the Department about concealment issues. So, the message is clear and direct that disagreement with the Department puts a person’s job in jeopardy. When the Department can eliminate an independent agency, administrative law judges certainly will understand that they must do what the Department wants or face similar elimination.

In workers’ compensation and equal rights cases, the political influence arising from division review will take a few months or perhaps even a year to make itself felt. But, it will be obvious to all at some point that the administrative law judges in these areas of law are following a requirement that exists outside of the hearing itself. Just as private arbitration has been rightly criticized as favoring repeat players over one-time complainants, so too will administrative law judges find themselves knowing how their bosses want cases decided and acting on that knowledge in order to keep their employment. After all, the division administrator will get to declare in every appeal what his or her opinion on the issues are. And, certainly any case that has political repercussions will be decided by those politics rather than the merits. These division administrators are political appointees, after all, who serve at the pleasure of the governor. As a result, the governor is free to inquire of them about how an appeal will be decided and inform that division administrator of the outcome the governor desires.

[UPDATE 7 March 2017: added citations to Gussert case regarding discussion of concealment cases the Department wants overturned.]

“Substantial” changes to substantial fault

Last week, the Appeals Court issued a decision in Operton v. LIRC that significantly changes how the Labor and Industry Review Commission and the Department of Workforce Development have been applying the substantial fault disqualification put into affect in 2014 by the Legislature over the rejection of the Advisory Council.

The Commission had previously held that substantial fault equals negligence and that the only way to avoid disqualification for a work-related mistake was for the claimant to demonstrate he or she lacked the skills or equipment to do the required work or that there was no prior warning from the employer about avoiding the mistake at issue. Operton significantly changes what employees need to show about their alleged lack of skills or whether their mistakes were inadvertent or not.

The case arose from a Madison unemployment clinic client that Marilyn Townsend took on. She and her partner, Fred Wade, made a crafty, inside attack into what substantial fault means and broke it apart from within. The appeals court held in Operton that: (1) some kind of employee intent behind the mistakes at issue were necessary to show that the mistakes were more than inadvertent and (2) employer warnings did not automatically transform an inadvertent mistake into an intentional act. As a result, accidental qua inadvertent actions should not disqualify claimants any more.

NOTE: Accidents that cause substantial damage to an employer’s property, however, can still qualify as misconduct under another change passed by the legislature over the rejection of that change by the Advisory Council. See Hamson v. Ozark Motion Lines, UI Hearing No. 14004168MD (5 March 2015).

As noted previously, substantial fault led to sharp decline in benefit payments. Given how important unemployment benefits are to those who need to pay rent and buy food, this decision should have a significant impact for many. But, that impact might only play out for those realizing they need to appeal initial denials of their benefit claims. As has emerged with how the Department applied concealment law the past several years, the Department will simply ignore legal precedents with which it disagrees and then re-write the law to match the outcome it desired.

UPDATE (19 Sept. 2016): After numerous legislators wrote the Advisory Council in a letter dated 1 April 2013 containing 33 proposed changes to unemployment law, the Department drafted a table detailing these proposals relative to the Department proposals that the council had before it already. See also “Advisory Council Meeting — 18 April 2013” (describing events of the April 18th Advisory Council meeting and linking to certain documents relevant to this meeting, including the April 1st letter and the DWD table). In this table, the Department projects missed savings of $17 million through the substantial fault and new misconduct disqualifications that the Advisory Council had declined to adopt. No explanation is available regarding why this amount differs from the earlier $19.2 million figure in the February 2013 version of D12-01. As indicated here, the financial impact of substantial fault has actually been much greater: between $67 to $64 million.

 

Letter to Governor Walker

In light of the Senate passage of AB819 on Tuesday of this week, I am sending a letter to Governor Walker urging him to line-item veto four provisions in the bill.

Dear Governor Walker:

I represent in my legal practice numerous employees and employers in unemployment law matters, and I urge you to line-item veto various provisions in AB819.

The provisions at issue consist of proposals by the Department of Workforce Development (“DWD” or “Department”) that create marked, unpredictable, and undesirable changes in unemployment law for the employees and employers of Wisconsin.

Changes to the definition of unemployment concealment

Sections 18 and 19 of the bill essentially make claimants strictly liable for their claim-filing mistakes. The proposed changes state that concealment is intentional but then disclaim that the Department does not have to prove that a claimant has such an intent. Furthermore, the proposed changes specify ways for a claimant to show no concealment that are so limited or specific that they essentially mean that concealment will be presumed.

This strict liability standard creates due process issues in unemployment law as well as significant problems for any criminal sanctions against claimants for actual concealment. The implications in criminal cases are especially problematic. While the intent requirement for concealment is being removed, criminal prosecutions for unemployment concealment still need mens rea to be shown. Because the mens rea is being administratively presumed rather then proven, claimants who commit actual concealment could likely avoid criminal prosecution for their fraudulent acts in light of this missing mens rea.

Creating a slush fund for Department expenditures

Sections 83-87 of the bill creates a fund for perpetually funding the Department’s program integrity efforts. This funding mechanism, however, lacks any criteria regarding this spending or legislative oversight and so allows for Department hiring and expenditures that are arbitrary. Accordingly, this program is the antithesis of small government .

Re-doing the prohibition on receiving unemployment benefits when receiving Social Security Disability Income (“SSDI”) benefits

Sections 20-25 of the bill re-write the prohibition on receiving unemployment benefits when already receiving SSDI benefits. An earlier and similar prohibition was enacted as part of 2013 Wis. Act 36. The Labor and Industry Review Commission (“LIRC” or “Commission”) initially held that the original prohibition only applied for the week when the claimant received his or her SSDI benefit check. Four circuit courts, however, reversed the Commission’s reasoning. As a result, there is now no legal need for re-writing this prohibition.

Furthermore, this new prohibition will, pursuant to section 103 of the bill, be retroactive to January 2014, the same time when the original prohibition became effective. Because of this retroactive application, this new prohibition creates a constitutional problem that will lead to a new round of litigation for the three to five claimants who received a few hundred dollars of unemployment benefits before the Commission decisions regarding the first prohibition were over-turned. The Department will end up spending thousands of dollars in litigation expenses and staff hours over a few hundred dollars in unemployment benefits. Since the first prohibition is now being enforced, there is simply no legal or economic need for this second retroactive prohibition.

Changing the procedures for obtaining review of a LIRC decision in circuit court

Sections 54 and 55 of the bill substantially alter the process, venue, and parties involved in appeals of Commission decisions. Among these proposed changes, the Department will have the right to file unemployment appeals in any county it chooses regardless of where employees or employers reside. Furthermore, because these changes presume that any party in an unemployment case risks default judgment when not answering a complaint, employers will need to file answers in claimant appeals of Commission decisions. Since Wisconsin requires any company to have an attorney representing it in court, employers will have to spend several hundred dollars for an attorney to file an answer on their behalf. Right now, employers can rely on the Commission to defend these cases and have no need for separate representation and the filing of answers.

The Commission tried to discuss these changes with the Department and the Advisory Council but was ignored. Without a voice in the process, the Commission formally opposed these changes at public hearings for this bill.

There are notable improvements in unemployment law in this bill. For instance, the provisions for protecting reimbursable employers from identity theft in section 73 of the bill are useful and well-done.

But, the four provisions mentioned here create confusion and legal complications about what unemployment law means and how to apply it. Please line-item veto these provisions.